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Abstract 
America's continuing obsession with the O.J. Simpson case can be explained as a defensive 
strategy of repetitive narration, to  avoid confronting the difficult issues the case raised. 
These narratives forrn a series of concentric circles, from the facts of the cases thernselves 
to the meta-analysis of the media. This paper analyzes these rnultiple levels and their inter- 
penetrations as a way of examining the mutual influence of culture and discourse upon 
each other. 
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1. Introduction: The O. J. phenomenon 
The O. J. Simpson case recently celebrated its one-year anniversary at the fore- 
front of American popular culture. As 1 write, it has just reached its narrative, 
if not temporal, halhay point with the resting of the prosecution. Intellectuals 
still sneer; the MacNeilILehrer Newshour on PBS still fastidiously avoids 
(*) Editor's note: This article was written in July 1995 and it makes reference to issues raised 
before the 0. J. Sirnpson trial ended. 
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mention of it. But the more ~opular  media, even the august paper of record, 
the New York Times, devote endless column inches and air time to it. Although 
polls regularly find that American viewers feel that too much media time is 
devoted to the trial, they must still be watching, since flagging ratings would 
drive the spectacle off the air. 
Soap operas, once the mainstay of middle America daytime television vie- 
wing, have lost a great deal of gound to the trial, which in the San Francisco 
area is telecast in full dady by both a cable and a UHF station, as well as being 
broadcast by a radio station. There are already prolific genres of O.J. Simpson 
jokes, Kato Kaelin jokes, Rosa Lopez jokes, and much more, yet another indi- 
cation that Americans presume in one another a familiarity and fascination 
with the case. 
The trial has spawned concern beyond its immediate consequences. There 
has been a good deal of worry in the media (the very media that obsessively 
cover it in every detail) about the ways in which the presence of cameras in 
the courtroom may have affected the outcome of the trial (e.g., Estrich 1995; 
Graham 1995), the ways in which the reportage of the trial may have affec- 
ted Americans' perception of the workings of the criminal justice system (e.g., 
Margolick 199%; Navarro 1995; Rimer 1995); and the ways in which the 
statements of dismissed jurors may be affecting the Americans' already troubled 
views of race relations in this country (eg ,  Chiang 1995). In short, the trial can 
no longer truly be characterized under its official name of the People of 
California vs. O.J. Simpson. Rather, it has become something closer to the 
People of the United States of America vs. Themselves, with O.J. Simpson 
and the courtroom personae as star witnesses. 
Intellectuals, of course, tend to take a sniffish attitude to the contretemps, 
as they have toward several of the more notorious trials of recent memory (the 
Menendez Brothers; William Kennedy Smith; Lorena Bobbit), feeling that l 
the popular interest displayed is itself the best evidence of the triviality and 
meretriciousness of the proceedings. But the fact public interest, ordinarily so 
fickle and short-lived, fastens so tenaciously on these cases, especially O. J.'s, 
suggests that people instinctively realize that they are relevant for us all. They 
define who we are at this moment, what we desire for ourselves, what we are l 
afraid of, and how our self-perceptions are conflicted and contradictory. 
2. The case as a creator of distress 
Crimes lilte these can cause individual and social distress and disorganiza- 
tion, if not resolved or at least neutralized. An ordinary murder is horrific 
enough, causing each of us to question our personal safety and the reliability 
of the social contract under which the government undertakes to protect us 
from one another; as well as (sometimes) causing each of us to reflect on our 
own propensity for violent actions. But a murder such as this goes far beyond 
that, being by any standard no ordinary crime, indeed, no ordinary double 
mur der. 
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The O.J. case calls into question a number of long-established and trus- 
ted presuppositions about how the world works and how we should think 
about people. Stereotypes we have been encouraged since childhood to believe 
in are abruptly shaken. Individually and collectively, we experience confusion 
and disorientation. Under such psychically threatening circumstances, 
psychoanalysts te11 us, we utilize defense mechanisms to ward off the threats 
and allow us to continue to appear -to ourselves and others- to be beha- 
ving and reacting rationally. 
3. The defense of narration as the basis for the phenomenon 
One favored defense is the turning of passive victimhood into the appearance 
of total control. One form this can take is the repeated acting out, or narrat- 
ing, of a painful event by its experiencer. So a child who has had a traumatic 
visit to the doctor will insist on playing «doctor» with dolls andlor friends for 
days afterward, in which the «victim» will become the «victimizer», the 
doctor, giving the injection to the passive do11 or younger sibling. Or an adult 
victim of a natural disaster will te11 the story again and again, as often as an 
audience can be found, until the pressure to te11 has receded (as those of us 
living in the Bay Area during the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 discovered: 
everyone we knew had a story to tell, and they told it, and told it.. .). Often, 
too, over time, the acting out or the narrative changes subtly over time, with 
each rehearsal allowing the experiencer more control. 
So, if indeed the Simpson case is arousing anxiety in the populace, it should 
not be surprising that there is an unslakable demand for reenactment and re- 
telling of the tale. Certainly we can identi+ some of the causes of the putative 
distress: the unsettling of the comforting and heretofore unquestioned myths 
that form some of the backbone of the American agenda. 
Perhaps the major question circles around the concept of jzlstice. It is a 
linchpin of the American way of life that we believe that justice exists, the 
same for al1 (equal justice under law, according to the fourteenth amendment 
in the Bill of Rights), in a nation united by common interests -«one nation 
... indivisible, with liberty and justice for all,» as we say solemnly at the end 
of the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag that we invoke at al1 official ceremon- 
ials. But the Simpson case from its beginning makes those secure assump- 
tions untenable, by dividing the citizenry into groups each of which sees in 
one or another aspect of the case a sign thar it is excluded from ~justice for 
all». Blacks, it is said, are apt to be framed by racist police; women who are 
abused by their husbands are apt to receive short shrift from the justice 
system. So there is no ((justice for all», and moreover, we are not «one nation 
indivisible)), since we cannot agree on any of these critiques. Further, the trial 
has suggested to many that the kind of justice a wealthy celebrity like Simpson 
can get is not what most people are likely to find: rather than «liberty and jus- 
tice for all», the trial suggests rhat those with money and charisma can get 
justice, and therefore remain at liberty, while the rest of us cannot. 
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4. Current problems the 0. J. case brings to consciousness 
By now, probably most Americans are willing to agree that at some time in the 
long-ago, darkpast African Americans were not treated with the same brand 
of justice as their white counterparts. Many (if not necessarily most) Americans 
are willing to agree that in that same hoary period, men had rights denied to 
women. But the accepted current presumption, as demonstrated by a great 
deal of public rhetoric over the last few years, combined with Supreme Court 
decisions and legislation actual and potential, would appear to be, approxi- 
mately, «That was then; this is now», and now that those injustices have been 
righted, there is fui1 equality under law for al U.S. citizens. (Cf. recent Supreme 
Court decisions that restrict the scope of civil rights and affirmative action 
legislation: e.g., Adzrand Constructors v. Pega (1 995), No. 93- 1 84 1, and Miller 
v. Johnson (1 999 ,  No. 94-63 1 .) Further, we learned in civics class, money and 
celebrity make no difference. Every citizen is constitutionally guaranteed the 
right to legal representation; rich and poor are treated alike by an impartid 
justice system. Indeed (the more thoughtful among us have argued) the very jus- 
tification of laws and legal systems is that they protect the poor from the depre- 
dation of the rich -the law is the great equalizer. 
Underlying these virtuous civic presuppositions are two widespread assump- 
tions about how to judge and treat others -assumptions that are often tacit, 
but always potent. As is typical of folklore, these stereotypes exist as a contra- 
d ic to r~  pair which the culture comfortably tolerates. But the Simpson case 
forces us into an uneasy awareness of our hypocrisies. The stereotype: Celebrities 
are better than the rest of us. They are somehow magical. They have charm, or 
charisma (which is what makes them celebrities), and part of their charm is 
their ability to get us to believe that they ?e not only great, but good. They are 
not only idols but ideals. 
While we invest in celebrities our hopes and dreams, we are also fond of 
exposés that destroy them: our expressions of envy, representing the counter- 
stereotype: Celebrities are degenerate and stand-offish. They got where they got 
by dubious means, and will stoop to anything to keep their status. Power 
corrupts, wealth corrupts, charisma corrupts most of all. 
Our edginess about these contradictions and self-denials makes us eager 
consurners of any defense that aüows us to live with ourselves and our coníüsions. 
A favorite is the narrative defense, the participation in the creation of multiple 
interlocking narratives about whatever it is that is troublesome, as a way of turn- 
ing our passive perplexity and sense of helplessness as we view incomprehen- 
sibly contradictory events into the illusion (at least) of active control: we make 
up the story, or piece various stories together to make a sensible whole. 
5. The cornplexity of the Simpson narrative 
At least six levels of concentric narration can be distinguished in the Simpson 
narrative, which the reader may imagine as organized into a series of concen- 
tric circles. 
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Level 1 is outside the narrative proper as it forms the basis for the story: this 
is the «real truthn, what actually happened. We have no way of knowing 
what this is. 
Level 2 is the story presented by the prosecution (and perhaps an alternate 
version offered by the defense). In an adversarial trial by jury, it is the task 
of the prosecution to present to the jury a «most plausible)) scenario: a 
narrative in which al1 the known facts ideally fit together to form a seam- 
less whole in which the jury can believe, and which identifies the defen- 
dant as the only person who could have committed the crime, the 
prosecution story as the only way in which the crime could have taken 
place «beyond reasonable doubtn. 
The defense's job, on the other hand, is to unravel and cast doubt on the 
prosecution's narrative. Popular courtroom fiction like Perry Mason and 
Matlock suggest that a good defense attorney (aided by his ingenious pri- 
vate investigator) will present an alternate, more plausible, scenario, exon- 
erating his client. The Simpson defense team hinted at its intention to 
do so in its opening statement, in which it alleged that the murders were 
committed by ((drug dealers)) in revenge for unpaid drug debts (or some- 
thing), and that the physical evidence against their client (the blood, the 
gloves, the hair and fibers.. .) were planted by racist and venal police offi- 
cers in order to frarne Simpson. In normal trial procedure, the defense vir- 
tually never offers, as it will apparently do here, a true alternate narrative 
-another way in which this trial is extraordinary. 
The probiem at Level 2 is that neither narrative is totally satisfactory The 
prosecution has not fully explained how 0. J. done could have committed 
two elaborately brutal murders in the time allotted, nor has it proved mo- 
tive to everyone's satisfaction. One dismissed juror has remarked that testi- 
mony about incidents of spousal abuse seem beside the point: everyone 
fights, not everyone murders. Several apparently are unconvinced by the 
seemingly incontrovertible DNA evidence: the prosecution is «drawing 
straws)), another reject stated confidently if unidiomatically. These aporias 
at Level 2 lead to the likelihood of an inability to construct a collabora- 
tive narrative (a verdict) at Level 3, and the efflorescences we observe at 
Levels 4 and 5. 
Level3. This is the narrative that the jurors, first separately and then as a 
group, must make of Level 2 narrative and its connection to Level 1, as 
they see it ( the jury as ((trier of fact))). Normally the jury's job is to use the 
defense deconstruction as a guide to determining the airtightness of the 
prosecution narrative. Has the prosecution established guilt beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt? They may, of course, adopt the prosecution theory in toto, 
or reject it in toto. They may, and often do, adopt parts of it in order to 
construct their own most-plausible narrative. If that narrative still places 
the defendant in the position of perpetrator, they will produce a «guilty» 
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verdict, even though they arrive at that conclusion by a path different from 
that of the prosecution, or may, as a compromise, find the defendant guilty 
of a «lesser included offense)), a less serious crime then he is charged with 
by the prosecution. Other things can happen. The jurors rnay disagree on 
whether any plausible narrative can be made at al1 of the data they have 
encountered, in which case the jury will hang: there will be no verdict 
(a common assumption about the outcome of this trial, at this point). Or, 
of course, the jurors rnay dislike one another so intensely that they are 
unwilling or unable to collaborate during deliberations in the construc- 
tion of the single narrative that is the requisite unanimous verdict, and 
again the result will be a mistrial. (There has been a good deal of testimony 
by dismissed jurors to this effect). 
In a normal trial, the conclusion of Level 3, the verdict, is the final 
narrative. A guilty verdict rnay be appealed to a higher court. But an appell- 
ate court does not have the role of constructing, or deconstructing, the 
jury's narrative. Appellate courts serve an interpretive function, the literary 
critic to the jury's/prosecution storyteller. Did the spinners of tales utilize 
al1 the materials available in a legitimate way? In the Simpson case, should 
there be a conviction, the defense would probabl~ appeal -but this is in 
the remote and improbable future. 
Ariother anomaly of the Simpson case is its use of a sequestered jury. 
Since December the jurors have been living in a wing of a hotel, under 24 
hour guard. They rnay not lock their doors, have unmonitored telephone 
calls, watch television or listen to radio. Their time and activities are totally 
controlled by the sheriff's deputies who guard them, and who apparently 
are allowed to enter their rooms at will to search for contraband (e.g., evi- 
dence that they are making notes for eventual publication). The purpose of 
sequestration is the avoidance of one sort of narrative interpenetration or 
corruption - that is, the influencing of the stories the jury is construc- 
ting by narratives at Level 4, the leve1 of media commentary. 
As important as the avoidance of contamination rnay be, the downside 
of sequestration is the infantilization of people who have lost total control 
of their time, their lives, and their possessions, whose movements are 
circumscribed, and who are placed in a situation they cannot fully com- 
prehend. The infantilization is already showing in the grumblings of the 
jurors who have been dismissed, which sound like a bad day in kinder- 
garten: There is childlike revenge: (&he kicked me», «He called me a bad 
name)); decisions like «Today let's al1 wear the same color clothes)); endless 
tattling: «She's writing a bookn; «He's making notes about usn. 
Sequestration rnay make it more difficult to reach a rational verdict, 
than vvould nonsequestration. Unquestionably sequestration shields jurors 
from direct influence by the media narratives as well as those of others in 
their environment. But their irn~enetrabilit~ is not absolute: as long as the 
principal actors (attorneys and judge) are demonstrably influenced in their 
preseritation of their cases and adjudication of it by media response, the 
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latter will trickle down to the jury, however subtly. A sequestered jury is 
apt to be rendered overdependent on what they can glean from the judge 
and the attorneys by their isolation from other creators of meaning. 
More seriously, the theory of sequestration is based on outmoded ideas 
about communication -namely, that silence equals noncommunication, 
that the absence of utterance is a void. But we know better: we know that 
silence, where utterance would be expected, is eloquent. The absence of 
access to opinion does not create a vacuum. 
Normally human beings who belong in a complex society are 
bombarded by information, real and quasi, at al1 times and from many 
sources. Much of this we filter out, but that continua1 access creates our 
sense of reality and our very sanity. What happens to a group of people 
denied al1 access to sources -newspapers, magazines, television, r a d i e  that 
they normally rely upon, not only for information on the 0. J. case, but 
everything else? The withdrawal of the drug must have painful side effects, 
no doubt including hallucinations (she looked at me funny; he's writing a 
book). Each juror must be producing internal substitutes -endorphins, 
if you will- for the external stimulant. Rather than relying on group 
process (the consensus of acquaintances and the media) for the interpre- 
tation of events, each juror is probably constructing an individual, perhaps 
quite idiosyncratic, account. 
Of course, jurors are supposed to construct individual accounts of tes- 
timony (Level 3), eventually to be compared with and related to the con- 
structs of the other jurors during deliberations, so that the jury as a whole 
produces its own seamless narrative in response to what they have heard 
during the trial. But ordinarily what filters in from the world outside, per- 
haps (illegally but invariably) about the trial itself as about everything else, 
provides checks and balances against the internal scenario the juror is con- 
structing, based on the juror's life experiences, idiosyncratic cognitive struc- 
tures, stereotypes, and prejudices. Without the external corrective, it is 
quite possible (particularly in a jury that may be sequestered for nearly a 
year) that their understandings of what is going on in court are becoming 
more and more distorted, their individual narratives increasingly idiosyn- 
cratic. In an ordinary trial (again illegally but typically), jurors do some 
discussing of court events with one another, testing their individual per- 
ceptions against a group consensus; but with jurors in this case encour- 
aged to report on one another, sharing of narratives is less apt to occur, so 
that each juror's individually constructed scenario will remain virginal, 
and increasingly bizarre, until deliberations. 
Level 4 is the media gloss of Levels 1-3. The media do more than simply report, 
that is reiterate what was said, and show pictures of trial events. But even 
that involves some subjective interpretation: what bits of the six-hour trial 
day to put into the five minute evening news segment? What pictures to use, 
putting which figures at an advantage or disadvantage? 
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Beyond that, this trial has spawned an army of media commentators. 
Every network, every local TV station has its own legal analyst, sometimes 
several. Talk shows regularly schedule these or other experts to summarize 
recent events and predict the future course of things. They assess what each 
bit of evidence «means», whether it was good or bad for prosecution or 
defense; assess the behavior of the principals: is Judge Ito controlling the 
attorneys? 1s Maria ClarkIJohnnie Cochran behaving in accordance with 
normal courtroom procedure? 1s their dress meaningful? They wring mean- 
ings out of Delphic mutterings of dismissed jurors: race islis not an issue in 
the jury; spousal abuse is lis not seen as prognosticator of murder. They 
try to determine what it al1 means: there willlwon't be a verdict; O.J. 
willlwon't testify; the defense willlwon't present a case. (Cf. Carlsen 1995; 
Chaing 1995d; Davidson 1995; Margolick 1994a; Margolick 1995a). 
This is also the level of incessant polls of ordinary citizens and attor- 
neys alike. These have shown (among other things) a steady increase in 
belief in Simpson's guilt, but at a significantly lower level in the black (60%) 
than in the white (80%) community; a belief both among attorneys and 
the common folk that O.J. will never be convicted, with a somewhat high- 
er percentage voting for a mistrial (either due to the dissolution of the jury 
before it can reach a verdict, or its inability to reach a verdict) than for 
outright acquittal; and a decrease from 63% in January of 1994 to 50% 
in June 1995 of public faith in the justice system (CBS Evening News poll, 
June 9, 1995). 
There is speculation at this level too about what the defense will do: 
not make a case at al1 (but then, won't the jury worry about the defense 
opening statement?); whether or not they will put O.J. on the stand (if 
they do, the prosecution gets to grill him in cross examination; if they 
don't, the jury will wonder why: cf. Chiang 1995e and Margolick 1995d). 
There is also puzzlement throughout the electronic media about one of 
the ragged ends left in the prosecution's case: why no testimony about the 
low-speed car chase, the $10,000 and passport found in the glove com- 
partment of the notorious Ford Bronco? why no testimony from Al 
Cowlings? why not recail Kato Kaelin to the stand to see if he's reaily per- 
jured himself? 
Level 5 is the interpretation of Level 4. This level, too, is muIti-tiered. It involves 
media looking at themselves and their influence (what has been the role 
of carneras in the courtroom? the role of reportage on the behavior of the 
principals? the role of eventual celebrity on the jurors?), and also deeper 
and broader questions about the fallout from the trial on Arnerican society 
generally: is it accentuating our aiready dangerous racial polarization? is it 
imbuing us with cynicism about the justice system? is it causing us to 
reevaluate our love affair with fame? Will it cause us to press for changes 
in the conduct of the trials? Suggestions, spurred on if not actually origi- 
nating with this trial, have already been made: to permit non-unanimous 
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verdicts in criminal cases; even to scrap the jury system completely in favor 
of an inquisitorial system (or anything rather than this). (cf. Chiang 199%; 
Estrich 1995; Graham 1995; Margolick 1994a; Margolick 1995b; Margolick 
1995~;  Navarro 1995; Rimer 1995). Also discussed at this leve1 are polls 
showing that the majority of the population are sick of O.J. and arent lis- 
tening any more; but these reports must be considered along with other 
facts, such as the continued high ratings of shows with O.J. reportage, and 
the awareness that even those pollees who are most adamant in their denun- 
ciation of trial coverage seem to have about every detail in the unfolding 
drama. 
Also part of Level 5 are comparisons of the relative competence of 
(other) media commentators (cf. Chiang 1995~).  
And finally there is Level 6, the meta-meta analysis, namely papers like 
this. (And if you, dear reader, discuss this paper, that becomes Level 7, and 
so on.. .). 
6. What it al1 means 
We do not yet know (although Level 5 has mulled it over) just what the trial 
represents. 1s it a total anomaly, a law unto itself that ought not to create pre- 
cedents or encourage changes in trial procedure? Or is it just an especially strik- 
ing example of the typical trial, a normal trial that just happens to be conducted 
in the glare of publicity, and do the miscarriages of justice we observe (or think 
we do) in this trial signal a need for reform of the whole system? (Chiang 
1995b; Chiang 1995d; Estrich 1995; Margolick 1995b). There are many rea- 
sons to believe the first hypothesis to be correct, but Auch of the critique, 
especially at more popular levels, presumes the second. 
And there is more that our attentiveness to the trial is making manifest. 
Deep racist and sexist tendencies in society are being at once brought to light 
and defended against (cf. Gorov 1995; Noble 1995; Chaing 1994; Chaing 
1995a; Davidson 1995; Hancock et al. 1995; Lara 1995; Margolick 1994a; 
Mayer 1995). Institutions such as the District Attorney and the Police 
Department, which we have tended to trust and even venerate, upon close 
inspection by a defense tearn with deep pockets, turn out to have feet of clay 
(Carlsen 1994; Margolick 1994b). 
Similarly, the trial is often considered a glaring example of jury miscon- 
duct, in which jurors chosen for preexisting racial prejudice (the (cace card))) 
use their position to «send a messagen to the larger society that it is incontro- 
vertibly racist. Even if that message is legitimate, many argue, it is dangerous 
to allow a jury to send that message by (as many believe will happen) refusing 
to convict a guilty defendant (by invoking the defense «frameup» theory). The 
jury is seen as out of control, following its own agenda rather than doing what 
it swore to do. 
Or  one can view the trial as a different sort of anomaly: the only jury in 
history to truly believe in the presumption of innocence of the defendant: 
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innocent ti11 proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Most prospective jurors 
in criminal trials have no trouble telling the court in voir dire that they can 
adhere to that standard, but post-verdict interviews often reveal that jurors 
formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty very early. 
If it is true that jurors in this case have really not made up their minds (as 
interviews with some of the ten dismissed jurors have suggested), that is not 
necessarily because they have virtuously avoided prejudging the case. In most 
cases conviction ~rovides an immediate positive ~ a ~ o f f  for a jury, as acquittal 
does not. 'To convict is to feel that the long and onerous job of jury duty was 
not in vain: the crime was solved, a dangerous perpetrator removed from the 
streets, and the right message was sent to society. Weighed against that happy 
conclusion is the possibility that the man at the table before you is the by pro- 
secutorial and police error -a light weight by comparison. 
In this case, however, a fairly even balance tends to keep the juror's minds 
open. Weighed against the horribleness of the crime and the need to solve it are 
both 0.J.S celebrity (which, as we have seen, may make jurors like the rest of 
us see him in the most favorable light) and the «race card)). 
If the jurors are indeed keeping open minds, they are among the few who 
are. The media have come down heavily in favor of guilt: their concerns are 
framed in terms of whether, for example, the prosecution's glove fiasco will 
keep justice from being done, keep the jury from convicting. They seldom 
wonder whether the gloves' failure to fit might mean that they did not belong 
to O.J. at all. 
7 .  Conclusions 
Beyond these legal concerns, the O.J. Simpson case and our obsession with it 
raise larger and more abstract questions. Beyond the anguish of facing the 
racist or sexist nature of current society lurks a related but darker question: 
the very definitions of race and gender. The writings of Freud began the reins- 
pection of apparently discrete mental categorizations, and since the early years 
of the century we have been continually forced to reexamine certain age-old 
presumptions of Judeo-Christian culture. 
Popularly both race and gender are seen as essential, inherent, and precisely 
definable characteristics that are given to individuals at conception and are an 
unchanging part of them ti11 death. Intellectual discourse increasingly recognizes 
both race and gender as constructed, as well as shifting and ambiguous, as 
much subjectively as objectively determined. This opposition inspires fear and 
loathing in traditional sectors of the community, even as they inspire fascina- 
tion. Over the last severa1 years, just about every TV talk show has done pro- 
grams on racial and sexual indeterminacy: transexualism and transvestism; 
whites who act black; blacks who like to date whites; people of mixed racial 
background. Audiences almost always respond with incomprehension and hos- 
tility, especially when it is a member of the politically dominant group (male 
or white) who has chosen to throw in his lot with the despised other. 
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A deep source of both fascination and the distress engendered by the 
Simpson case is that 0.1. is someone who is racially indeterminate. Earlier in 
his career, his ability to cross over and act «white» made him a star; now it is rais- 
ing problems. He was married to (and is accused of killing) a (blond) white 
woman. Granting that our attitudes are colored as much (at least) by what we 
want to be true, as by what we see in the media, how does 0.J.S status as dis- 
turbingly ambiguous figure impel us to view him? 
Finally, there are two more background issues stirred up by the Simpson 
epiphenomena. This trial (along with some earlier examples) has begun to 
obscure another previously sharp categorial distinction, this one distinguish- 
ing two institutions: entertainment and justice. In the future, will trials be 
Neilson rated? Will judges be appointed on the bases of their telegenic capa- 
cities? 
Trials function in societies as ways to determine «the truth)) about what 
«really» happened. It is clear enough that that definition of a satisfactory pro- 
cedure is unlikely to be met in this case, whether because it ends in a mistrial, 
or because a verdict dissatisfies the majority of the community. But beyond 
that, the ambipities and indeterminacies of this case and its conduct cal1 into 
question the existence of any notion of a discoverable, single, truth. If «the 
truthv cannot be ferreted out via a procedure expressly conceived millennia 
ago to accomplish that precise aim; despite (more accurately, to be sure, 
because) the great expense of time and money, then where if at al1 is «truth» 
reliably to be found? The trial and its commentary are beginning to suggest 
that there is a «black truth)) -when in doubt, doubt the system, and a ((white 
truth»- trust institutions unless there is really good reason not to. As with 
many aspects of current social indeterminacy, the comfortable age-old assump- 
tion that there was only one realtruth, the one espoused by and useful to the 
powerful, is being demolished by what we see and hear every day. The results, 
when the dust settles, could be cataclysmic. 
The multiplicity of narratives, superimposed on an event itself built on 
indeterminacy and ambiguity, means that al1 kinds of «truths» are being sub- 
jected to examination in the trial of O.  J. Simpson. But the complexities of 
the case mean that there is no posible way we will ever know the «real» truth 
if there is one. If (as is currently believed) there is no verdict, that fact will be 
apparent at once. If there should be a verdict, though, that will not put al1 
doubts and fears to rest. 
The eventual result of the trial may well be the forced recognition by every- 
one of the reality of multiple meanings, multiple narratives, and the elusiveness 
of the truth. If so, it will be recopized by future historians as the final triumph 
of postmodernism, just in time for the millennium. 
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